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1 Introduction
When organizing production on a global scale, firms face the issue of contractual insecurity.
In case of a dispute between cooperation parties, courts may be constrained in their ability
to verify each party’s deviation from the contract or unable to enforce verdicts upon subjects
of different jurisdictions. Since an international arbitration process is also costly and time-
consuming, firms often rely on relational contracts – informal long-term agreements sustained
by the value of future relationship (Dixit 2004, MacLeod 2007). Yet, anecdotal evidence
suggests that the ability of economic agents to engage in relational contracting hinges on
their time preference rates, which systematically vary across countries.
One of the most widely documented examples in this context is the case study of two
major automobile manufacturers, a Japanese corporation Toyota and an American enter-
prise General Motors (GM). The former is well known for making extensive use of relational
contracts (see, e.g., Board 2011 and Gibbons and Henderson 2012). As attested in a com-
prehensive survey by Helper and Henderson (2014: 59), “as long as [Toyota’s suppliers] make
a good-faith effort to perform as they should, the assembler will ensure that they receive
a reasonable return on their investment [...], and as long as the supplier continued to meet
the automaker’s expectations, the supplier could count on the relationship continuing indef-
initely”. In contrast, GM’s cooperation with its suppliers is characterized by short-term –
usually one-year – contracts focusing almost entirely on immediate financial results. The
U.S. automobile manufacturer had been reportedly struggling to adopt its main competi-
tor’s relational governance approach, but with little success (see Helper and Henderson 2014).
Business practitioners and academic researchers generally agree that GM’s inability to imi-
tate Toyota’s organizational practices can be traced back to inherent differences in long-term
orientation between Japanese and American managers.
Albeit anecdotal in its nature, the case study of Toyota vs.GM suggests a general research
question: Do cross-country differences in long-term orientation, defined as the willingness of
economic agents to forfeit instant gratification for the sake of long-term monetary benefits,
have an impact on the organizational behavior of firms in those countries? This paper
aims at shedding some light on this question by studying the effect of time discounting
on the global organization of production. More specifically, I investigate how the level of
long-term orientation affects a multinational firm’s decision to integrate a foreign supplier
into firm boundaries or cooperate with the latter at arm’s length, thereby emphasizing the
role of relational contracting. This paper argues, both theoretically and empirically, that
the relative prevalence of vertical integration is increasing in the final good producers’ and
suppliers’ levels of long-term orientation.
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The model presented in this paper builds on the seminal theory of a multinational firm
along the lines of Antràs and Helpman (2004) and embeds it into a repeated-game context
suggested by Baker et al. (2002). The rationale behind this approach lies in the notion that
business cooperations involving relationship-specific investments are the ones where long-
term relationships may prevail. The mere possibility of a repeated interaction opens the
door to relational contracting. More specifically, a final good producer and a supplier may
commit at the outset to provide first-best investment levels in all subsequent periods of the
game and sustain this agreement by the value of future relationship. It is well known from
the Folk theorem, however, that the incentive compatibility of such an agreement crucially
depends on both parties’ time preference rates. More specifically, a final good producer and
supplier are willing to engage in relational contracting only if both parties are sufficiently
long-term oriented. If the relational agreement is not self-enforcing, parties negotiate in
each period ‘on the spot’ regarding the division of surplus and are stuck with the hold-up
problems well-known from Antràs and Helpman (2004). The latter type of cooperation will
be referred to throughout as spot contracting.
Regardless of whether cooperation parties are able to enter a relational agreement or ne-
gotiate in every period on the spot, final good producers face the make-or-buy decision, i.e.
choose whether to integrate a supplier into firm boundaries or source intermediate inputs
at arm’s length. Overall, this paper allows for four organizational modes: spot integra-
tion, spot outsourcing, relational integration and relational outsourcing. The make-or-buy
decision under spot contracting is analogous to Antràs and Helpman (2004): A final good
producer integrates (outsources) manufacturing production if the importance of manufac-
turing components in the production process is low (high, respectively). This result is in
the spirit of the canonical Property Rights Theory of the firm along the lines of Grossman
and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990): In order to minimize ex ante underinvestment,
ownership rights over non-verifiable inputs are assigned to the party whose investment con-
tributes relatively more to the value of the relationship.
The choice of the ownership form under relational contracting, however, serves a different
purpose. Since parties implicitly agree to provide the first-best amount of relationship-
specific inputs, final good producers no longer aim at incentivizing ex ante investment.
Instead, the make-or-buy decision is made so as to minimize suppliers’ incentives to renege
on the relational agreement. The model shows that a supplier’s deviation incentives under
relational integration are lower than under relational outsourcing. Intuitively, if a final good
producer possesses property rights over a supplier’s assets, the supplier has a low bargaining
position in case of a deviation from the relational agreement. Therefore, final good producers
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under relational contracting strictly prefer integration over outsourcing.
Depending on both parties’ time preference rates, a final good producer decides whether
to enter a relational agreement or cooperate with a supplier on the spot. Given that final
good producers engaged in relational contracting always source manufacturing inputs within
firm boundaries, whereas those ‘stuck’ with spot contracting integrate a supplier only if
the importance of manufacturing components in the production process is relatively low
(and cooperate with the latter at arm’s length otherwise), the model suggests the following
key testable prediction: The prevalence of vertical integration is (weakly) increasing in the
supplier’s and final good producer’s levels of long-term orientation.
I test this hypothesis by pooling together several datasets. To measure the relative preva-
lence of vertical integration, I follow the bulk of the recent empirical literature on multina-
tional firm boundaries in using U.S. Census Bureau’s Related Party Trade data.1 More
specifically, I use the share of U.S. intra-firm imports in total U.S. imports as the dependent
variable. The independent variable is a country’s index of long-term orientation, drawn from
Hofstede et al. (2010). This score represents one of the five key cultural dimensions identified
by Geert Hofstede to measure fundamental cultural differences and is generally recognized
as a valid proxy for a country’s time preference rate (see Galor and Özak 2014). As argued
by Hofstede et al. (2010), individuals in countries with a high level of long-term orientation
value persistence, perseverance, and are willing to delay short-term material gratification in
favor of long-term benefits. In contrast, individuals in short-term oriented countries care
more about immediate gratification than long-term fulfillment. In line with the paper’s key
prediction, I find a positive relationship between the share of U.S. intra-firm imports and a
foreign country’s long-term orientation score. Importantly, this association remains signifi-
cant after controlling for a standard set of explanatory factors that have been suggested in
empirical studies of the Property Rights Theory of a multinational firm.
Since the above-mentioned relationship can potentially be driven by unobserved het-
erogeneity across countries, and a country’s long-term orientation might be endogenous to
economic outcomes, the identification of a causal effect of long-term orientation on the make-
or-buy decision calls for an instrumental variables approach. To provide valid instruments
for a country’s time preference rate, I exploit genetic data from Gorodnichenko and Roland
(2011). More specifically, I construct two alternative measures of genetic distance between
the population in a given country and the population in one of the most long-term oriented
countries, Japan. Both measures are highly correlated with a country’s current level of long-
1 Given that comprehensive firm-level datasets on the international integration decisions are not readily
available, this industry-level dataset has become a workhorse tool in empirical studies of international
make-or-buy decisions, cf. Antràs (2013, 2015).
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term orientation. This association can be rationalized in the light of recent literature, which
argues that parents pass on not only their genes but also cultural traits to the offspring,
see, e.g., Bisin and Verdier (2010) for an overview.2 At the same time, since international
make-or-buy decision is exogenous to a country’s genetic characteristics, the instruments
fulfill the exclusion restriction. Using these instruments, I find a positive effect of foreign
suppliers’ long-term orientation on the share of intra-firm imports from a given country.
In order to assess the effect of a final good producer’s time preference rate on the relative
prevalence of vertical integration, I construct a measure of long-term orientation that varies
across U.S. sectors. For this purpose, I use information on ancestry from the 2000 U.S. Census
to calculate the prevalence of managers and CEOs from a certain cultural background in a
given industry. Weighing these ethnic shares with the long-term orientation scores of their
ancestors’ countries, I construct industry-specific indices of long-term orientation and merge
them with the above-mentioned Related Party Trade data. In accordance with the model’s
prediction, I find a positive relationship between final good producers’ long-term orientation
levels and the share of intra-firm imports in a given industry. This association remains
significant after including a standard set of control variables and correcting for unobserved
cross-country variation using country and year fixed effects.
As a robustness check, I rerun the regressions using a country’s level of trust as an
alternative proxy for relational contracting. Since relational contracts are generally perceived
as trust-based agreements (MacLeod 2007), a higher level of trust is arguably conducive to
the emergence of implicit agreements between final good producers and their suppliers. The
measure of trust is constructed using the well-known generalized trust question from the
World Values Survey (see Guiso et al. 2010). In line with this paper’s key theoretical
prediction, I find that higher level of trust in the home and host country is associated with
greater share of intra-firm imports. To better understand if this relationship is causal, I follow
Algan and Cahuc (2010) in instrumenting the current level of trust by its inherent component.
The instrumental variables estimates broadly confirm the OLS results, suggesting that a
higher level of trust leads to more intra-firm trade.
Related literature. This paper is not the first to embed the static framework along the
lines of Antràs and Helpman (2004) into a repeated game. Kukharskyy and Pflüger (2015)
do so to study the effect of relational contracting on the economic well-being of nations.
Unlike the current paper, however, the authors do not derive a clear empirical prediction
regarding the effect of home and host country’s long-term orientation on the international
make-or-buy decision nor bring this prediction to the data.
2 To be clear, this paper does not presuppose a causal relationship between genes and cultural attributes
such as long-term orientation, but rather exploits the correlation between the two.
4
From the empirical perspective, this paper is related to the burgeoning literature that
aims to better understand the effect of culture on international trade and foreign direct in-
vestment. Gorodnichenko et al. (2015) find a negative effect of cultural distance, measured
as the difference in individualism scores, on intra-firm trade. Using historically motivated
instrumental variables, Siegel et al. (2011, 2013) find a negative effect of egalitarianism dis-
tance, defined as the difference in the belief that all people are of equal worth and should
be treated equally in society, on foreign direct investment flows, cross-national flows of bond
and equity issuances, syndicated loans, and mergers and acquisitions. Guiso et al. (2009)
construct a measure of bilateral trust between European countries and instrument it with
religious, genetic, and somatic similarities to show that lower bilateral trust leads to less
trade and less direct and portfolio investment between two countries. Using data from the
Eurovision Song Context, Felbermayr and Toubal (2010) construct a measure of cultural
proximity and show a strong positive effect of this measure on trade volumes. Yet, none of
these empirical studies consider the effect of long-term orientation on intra-firm trade.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 lays out the basic set
up. Section 3 describes the make-or-buy decision under spot and relational contracting and
derives the key testable prediction. Section 4 presents econometric evidence supporting this
paper’s key proposition. Section 5 concludes.
2 The set-up
The model economy consists of a home country, N , and F ≥ 1 foreign countries, denoted
by the subscript `. Foreign countries ` differ regarding their production cost, geographical
distance to N , and the time preference rate of their managers. Each country is populated
by a unit measure of consumers, who are symmetric in terms of their utility functions. Each
consumer is endowed with a unit of inelastically supplied labor. A subset of individuals also
possess entrepreneurial abilities, which allow them to become firm managers.
Demand. Along the lines of Antràs and Helpman (2004), the utility function is assumed to
be:
U = x0 + µ
J∑
j=1
lnXj , Xj =
[∫
xj(v)
αdv
]1/α
, µ > 0 , 0 < α < 1, (1)
where x0 is consumption of a homogenous good, Xj is an index of aggregate consumption
of differentiated goods in sector j, and xj(v) denotes consumption of a differentiated variety
v in this sector. Parameter µ measures the intensity of preferences for differentiated goods
and α is a parameter related to the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties,
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σ = 1/(1 − α). The budget constraint reads ∑Jj=1 PjXj + x0 = Y , where Y denotes a
household’s income, Pj ≡
[∫
pj(v)
1−σdv
]1/(1−σ) is the price index of differentiated goods,
and pj(v) represents the price of a single variety v in sector j. Utility maximization yields
demand functions for the differentiated goods bundle, a single differentiated variety, and the
homogenous good, respectively:3
Xj = µP
−1
j , xj(v) = µpj(v)
− 1
1−αP
α
1−α
j , x0 = Y − µ. (2)
Production. The homogenous good is produced in both countries under constant returns
to scale and perfect competition. Production of one unit of output requires aN units of labor
in home country and a` > aN labor units in a foreign country ` (i.e. workers in N are assumed
to be more productive than in any foreign country). This numéraire good is assumed to be
costlessly traded, implying the same (unitary) price in all countries. Consequently, the model
exhibits a constant wage differential between the home country and foreign destinations:
wN > w` ∀ `. For simplicity, I normalize the wage rate in N to unity, wN = 1.
Production technology of differentiated varieties draws on Antràs and Helpman (2004).
Provision of each variety v requires two relationship-specific inputs: headquarter services
hj(v) and manufacturing components mj(v), supplied by headquarter firms H and manufac-
turing suppliersM , respectively. Each intermediate input is produced with one unit of labor
per unit of output. These inputs are combined to final goods according to the following
Cobb-Douglas production function:4
xj(v) =
(
hj(v)
ηj
)ηj (mj(v)
1− ηj
)(1−ηj)
, (3)
where parameter ηj ∈ (0, 1) captures the relative importance of headquarter services (hence-
forth, headquarter intensity) in the production process of sector j.
Establishment of a firm (H or M) requires one entrepreneur as a fixed cost. Each en-
trepreneur is an owner-manager of the unit and reaps this unit’s operating profit. As in
Antràs and Helpman (2004), provision of headquarter services occurs strictly in N . Manu-
facturing suppliers, however, are located in foreign countries.5 I assume that final assembly of
3 I assume sufficiently small preferences for differentiated goods (i.e., µ < Y ) to ensure positive consump-
tion of the homogenous good in equilibrium.
4 For simplicity, I refrain from modeling firm heterogeneity regarding productivity. However, this feature
can be easily introduced into the current framework along the lines of Antràs and Helpman (2004)
without qualitatively affecting its main results.
5 This model can be easily extended by assuming that M are located both in N and F and allowing H
to choose between domestic and foreign sourcing, cf. Antràs and Helpman (2004). However, given that
domestic sourcing is not observable in the dataset used in the empirical part of the paper, it is ruled
out at the outset.
6
manufacturing components and headquarter services into final goods takes place in N . Inter-
national trade in manufacturing components is costly, as τ` > 1 units ofm need to be shipped
from a foreign country ` for one unit to arrive in N . Similarly, shipment of final goods from
N to ` is associated with identical iceberg transport cost, τ` > 1. Given the mill (fob.) price
of final goods, pNj(v), the price paid by consumers in foreign country ` is p`j(v) = τ`pNj(v).
Due to a symmetry of final good producers, the price indices prevailing in N and ` can be
expressed as PNj = (nNj)−
1−α
α pNj(v) and P`j = τ`PNj, respectively, where nNj represents the
number of final good producers in sector j. Combining these results with equation (2), yields
total output of variety v, xj(v) = µpNj(v)−
1
1−αP
α
1−α
Nj +
∑
` τ`µ (τ`pNj(v))
− 1
1−α (τ`PNj)
α
1−α . Us-
ing this expression together with (3) and the fact that PNj = µX−1Nj yields total revenue from
the final goods production:
Rj(v) =
(
hj(v)
ηj
)αηj (mj(v)
1− ηj
)α(1−ηj)
µF 1−αX−αNj . (4)
The revenue positively depends on the preference parameter, µ, the number of foreign coun-
tries F a good is supplied to and the aggregate demand level, XNj, which is exogenous from
the viewpoint of a single producer, but determined endogenously in the industry equilibrium.
To save on notation, I drop the variety index v and the sector index j from now on.
Contractual environment and organizational form. As in Antràs and Helpman (2004),
the setting is one of incomplete contracts. Courts cannot verify the quality of intermediate
inputs, and cooperating parties cannot sign ex ante enforceable contracts specifying the
purchase of relationship-specific manufacturing components for a certain price. Against the
backdrop of contractual incompleteness, a headquarter decides whether to integrate (I) the
manufacturing supplier into firm boundaries or to outsource (O) manufacturing production
to an independent supplier. The ex ante stipulated organizational form, k ∈ {I, O} is
verifiable and enforceable by the courts.
In contrast to the one-shot game in Antràs and Helpman (2004), firms in the current
model interact repeatedly. This alternative assumption aims at capturing the notion that
business cooperations involving relationship-specific investments are the ones where long-
term relationships predominate. It is well-known from the literature on repeated games
(Baker et al. 2002) that the threat of discontinuing a long-term relationship may ensure
some cooperation despite contractual incompleteness. However, the ability of cooperating
parties to sustain a long-term cooperation depends on their time preference rates. Let
δN ≡ 1/(1 + dN) denote the discount factor of a headquarter manager and δ` ≡ 1/(1 + d`)
the discount factor of a supplier manager in country `, whereby dN and d` represent the
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respective rates of time preference (discount rates). The time preference rates in each country
are distributed according to a distribution function Γ(d). To accord with the empirical
evidence presented below, I assume that the mean of these distribution functions differs
across countries. In words, individuals in some countries are (on average) more long-term
oriented than in others.
The game begins with the headquarters choosing locations ` for production of manu-
facturing inputs. In each foreign destination, the headquarters are matched with suppliers
and cooperation parties discover the time preference rates of their respective counterparts.
Depending on the revealed long-term orientation of the supply manager, H chooses one of
the two governance modes: spot (s) vs. relational (r) contracting. Under a spot contract,
parties bargain in each period with regard to the compensation of relationship-specific invest-
ments. This ex-post negotiation process takes place via Nash bargaining, whereby H obtains
a fraction βk ∈ (0, 1) of the revenue. Following Antràs and Helpman (2004), I assume that
headquarters obtain a greater share of surplus under vertical integration compared to out-
sourcing, βI > βO. The intuition behind this assumption stems from the canonical Property
Rights Theory of the firm along the lines of Grossman and Hart (1986): Integration gives
H residual control rights over M ’s inputs, which in turn enhances the former’s bargaining
position and increases H’s ex post fraction of the revenue.
Under relational contracting, final good producers and their suppliers enter at the outset
an informal agreement to provide the first-best level of inputs in all subsequent periods of
the game. Furthermore, H commits to compensate M with an ex-post bonus Bk if the
latter honors this agreement.6 However, since the quality of relationship-specific investment
is not verifiable, such an agreement cannot be enforced by the courts. Hence, a supplier may
renege on the relational contract by ex ante underinvesting in manufacturing components.
Similarly, a headquarter may provide a suboptimal level of headquarter activities and refuse
to transfer the promised bonus to the supplier. In case any party reneges on the implicit
contract, the implicit agreement is broken and the surplus in this period is shared according
to the above-mentioned Nash-bargaining (with H obtaining a fraction βk of the revenue).
It is assumed that neither of the current partners can enter into a new relational agreement
with a third party. In other words, in case of a deviation from a relational agreement in one
period, both parties are ‘punished’ by non-cooperation and zero profits in all future periods.7
Timing. Under a governance mode g ∈ {s, r} and ownership form k ∈ {I, O}, the timing
of events in a single period (product cycle) of the game can be summarized as follows.
6 As will be shown below, equilibrium bonus depends on the choice of the organizational form k ∈ {I,O}.
7 This ‘grim trigger’ strategy can be justified by assuming a Commercial Registry, which contains infor-
mation on all business relationships and is common knowledge for all market participants.
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If H selects spot contracting (s), the consequent timing reads:
s1: H and M simultaneously and independently invest in hk and mk, respectively.
s2: Headquarters and suppliers negotiate about the division of surplus, whereby H obtains
the fraction βk of the revenue.
s3: Final goods are produced and sold. The revenue is distributed between parties accord-
ing to the sharing rule negotiated in s2.
If H selects relational contracting (r), the consequent timing reads:
r1: Both parties commit to provide the first-best level of non-contractible inputs hk and
mk. H commits to pay a bonus Bk to M , if the latter sticks to this agreement.
r2: H and M simultaneously invest in hk and mk as agreed in r1.
r3: The final goods are produced and sold. The revenue is distributed between parties
according to the compensation rule agreed upon in r1.
The product cycle stated above is repeated in all future periods of the game, t = 1, ...,∞.
The following section solves this game by backward induction.
Before describing the equilibrium of the game, it is worth pausing to briefly discuss
this paper’s assumption regarding the surplus sharing between two parties. Notice that the
timing specified above does not include ex ante lump-sum transfers, commonly assumed in
the literature to ensure that the entire surplus from cooperation accrues to headquarters,
see Antràs and Helpman (2004, 2008). As asserted by Antràs and Staiger (2012: 3148), “the
feasibility of these transfers is particularly hard to defend in the international context [...],
where such transfers and the obligations associated with them might be difficult to enforce.”
However, I show in Appendix A.3 that this paper’s main results are robust to allowing for
the ex-ante transfers.
3 Optimal organizational structure
3.1 Spot governance
To characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game described above, consider first
date s2 under spot contracting. At this stage, H chooses h to maximize βkR(h,m) − h,
whereas M picks m to maximize (1 − βk)R(h,m) − w`τ`m. Using (4), this maximization
problem yields equilibrium investment levels
hsk` = βkηαR
s
k` , m
s
k` = (1− βk)
(
1− η
w`τ`
)
αRsk`, (5)
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and the associated revenue under spot contracting
Rsk` =
(
βηk(1− βk)(1−η)
) α
1−α (w`τ`)
−α(1−η)
1−α A, (6)
where A ≡ µ 11−αα α1−αFX−
α
1−α
N has been defined for notational simplicity. Using (5) and (6)
in maximization problems above, we obtain H’s and M ’s profits under spot contracting
pisHk` = βk
(
βηk(1− βk)(1−η)
) α
1−α (w`τ`)
−α(1−η)
1−α A(1− αη),
pisMk` = (1− βk)
(
βηk(1− βk)(1−η)
) α
1−α (w`τ`)
−α(1−η)
1−α A(1− α(1− η)).
(7)
Consider next the choice of organizational form in s1. A headquarter decides to cooperate
with a supplier under spot integration rather than spot outsourcing whenever
ΘsH(η) ≡
pisHI`
pisHO`
=
βI
βO
(
βηI (1− βI)(1−η)
) α
1−α
(βηO(1− βO)(1−η))
α
1−α
(8)
is larger than one. I prove in Appendix A.1 that the relative attractiveness of spot integration,
as measured by ΘsH(η), is increasing in the headquarter intensity η. The intuition behind
this result stems from the Property rights theory of the firm: If a supplier’s contribution the
production process becomes less important, the need for incentivizingM ’s ex ante investment
via outsourcing decreases. Furthermore, Appendix A.1 proves that integration dominates
outsourcing for high enough headquarter intensities, i.e.ΘsH(η = 1) > 1. For low headquarter
intensities, however, outsourcing dominates integration if and only if 1−βI < α. Intuitively,
if a supplier’s revenue share under integration is sufficiently low, headquarters in sectors with
greater importance of manufacturing inputs relinquish control over these inputs in order to
restore M ’s investment incentives (recall that 1 − βO > 1 − βI). In order to allow for the
coexistence of both organizational form, this paper imposes
Assumption 1. 1− βI < α.
Under this assumption, we have
Lemma 1. There exists a unique headquarter intensity ηˆ ∈ (0, 1), such that headquarter
profit is higher under spot outsourcing for η < ηˆ and higher under spot integration for η > ηˆ.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Although this result is well-known from Antràs and Helpman (2004), it can be consid-
ered as complementary given that it does not rely on the assumption of ex-ante transfers.
In other words, while the organizational form in the original contribution is chosen so as
to maximize joint profit from cooperation, headquarters in the current model choose the
ownership structure which maximizes their own fraction of profits under spot contracting.
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3.2 Relational governance
3.2.1 Equilibrium path
When H and M enter a relational contract, they implicitly agree to provide the level of
investment that maximizes joint firm profit pi(h,m) = R(h,m)− h−w`τ`m. Using (4), this
maximization problem yields equilibrium investment levels and the associated revenue:
hrk` = ηαR
r
k` , m
r
k` =
(
1− η
w`τ`
)
αRrk` , R
r
k` = (w`τ`)
−α(1−η)
1−α A. (9)
Comparing these results with (5), it immediately follows that investment levels under rela-
tional contracting are higher than under spot governance, i.e. hrk` > hsk` and mrk` > msk`.
Intuitively, a relational contract eliminates the hold-up problem associated with ex post
bargaining and provides higher ex ante investment incentives compared to spot contracting.
This immediately implies a higher revenue under relational governance mode, Rrk` > Rsk`.
Given that hrk` and mrk` maximize joint firm profit, they will be referred to as first-best in-
vestment levels in what follows. If a supplier provides the first-best level of manufacturing
components, mrk`, the headquarter compensates him with a bonus Bk` and both parties’
profits are given by pirHk` = Rrk` − hrk` − Bk` and pirMk` = Bk` − w`τ`mrk`, respectively. Using
(9) therein, profits on the equilibrium path under relational contracting read
pirHk` = (w`τ`)
−α(1−η)
1−α A(1− αη)−Bk`,
pirMk` = Bk` − α(1− η)(w`τ`)−
α(1−η)
1−α A.
(10)
If the relational contract is self-enforcing, there exits a bonus Bk` which ensures both parties’
non-negative profits in equilibrium. As will be shown in the next section, this equilibrium
bonus crucially depends on a supplier’s profits on the deviation path.
3.2.2 Off-the-equilibrium path
Since a relational contract is implicit and not verifiable by the courts, each party may renege
on it. Consider first a supplier’s deviation (D) incentives. M can renege on the relational
agreement by delivering a sub-optimal level of manufacturing inputs, m < mrk`. In this case,
the relational contract is broken and the distribution of this period’s revenue between H and
M occurs according to ex post bargaining with exogenous shares βk and (1−βk), respectively.
M ’s maximization problem on the deviation path reads maxm(1−βk)R(hrk`,m)−m, whereby
hrk` isH’s first-best level of headquarter services from (9). This maximization problem implies
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the following investment level and revenue:
mDk` = (1− βk)
(
1− η
w`τ`
)
αRDk` , R
D
k` = (1− βk)
α(1−η)
1−α(1−η) (w`τ`)
−α(1−η)
1−α A. (11)
A simple comparison of (11) and (9) implies a lower supplier investment on the deviation
path as compared to the first best level, i.e. mDk` < mrk`.8 Utilizing (11) inM ’s maximization
problem, a supplier’s equilibrium profit on the deviation path reads:
piDMk` = (1− βk)
1
1−α(1−η) (w`τ`)
−α(1−η)
1−α A(1− α(1− η)). (12)
Given the trigger strategy specified above, a supplier can reap these deviation profits only
once and is ‘punished’ by non-cooperation in future periods of the game. A supplier honors
the relational contract whenever the present value of his profits under relational contracting,
pirMk` +
∞∑
t=1
(
1
1+d`
)t
pirMk` = pi
r
Mk` +
pirMk`
d`
, is larger than his one-shot deviation profit, piDMk`.
M ’s incentive compatibility constraint (ICCM) thus reads:
pirMk` +
pirMk`
d`
≥ piDMk`, (13)
whereby pirMk` and piDMk` are given by (10) and (12), respectively. As long as this ICCM
is fulfilled, there exists a bonus Bk` which induces the supplier’s first-best investment in
perpetuity. The headquarter has an incentive to stipulate the smallest possible bonus, which
still fulfills the ICCM . Manipulating (13), this bonus can be expressed as
Bk` = (w`τ`)
−α(1−η)
1−α A
[
α(1− η) + d`
1 + d`
(1− βk)
1
1−α(1−η) (1− α(1− η))
]
. (14)
Utilizing (14) in (10), yields per-period profits of H and M on the equilibrium path under
relational contracting:
pirHk` = (w`τ`)
−α(1−η)
1−α A
[
(1− α)− d`
1 + d`
(1− βk)
1
1−α(1−η) (1− α(1− η))
]
,
pirMk` = (w`τ`)
−α(1−η)
1−α A
[
d`
1 + d`
(1− βk)
1
1−α(1−η) (1− α(1− η))
]
.
(15)
Notice that a supplier’s profit is non-negative for all parameter values (i.e. M ’s participation
8 A tedious but straightforward analysis shows that supplier’s investment on the deviation path is higher
than under spot contracting, i.e. mDk` > m
s
k`. The result stems from the complementarity of inputs m
and h and the fact thatH’s investment under relational agreement is higher than under spot contracting.
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constraint may be ignored). A headquarter’s profit, however, is positive if and only if
(1− α) > d`
1 + d`
(1− βk)
1
1−α(1−η) (1− α(1− η)) (16)
As shown in Appendix A.2, this condition crucially depends on three factors.9 First, it is
more likely to hold the lower headquarter intensity, η. Intuitively, when H’s contribution
to the relationship is low, M can hardly exert ex post hold-up and the supplier’s incentives
to renege on the relational agreement decrease. Second, this condition is more likely to be
fulfilled the lower the d`, i.e. the more long-term oriented a supplier. Intuitively, as the long-
term orientation of a supplier increases, ICCM can be satisfied with a smaller bonus and H’s
profits from relational contracting increase. Finally, condition (16) is more likely to hold the
higher a headquarter’s share of surplus from ex post bargaining, βk. Intuitively, a higher βk
reduces M ’s bargaining position on the deviation path and decreases the latter’s one-shot
deviation incentives, see (12). Since βI > βO, the ICCM under relational integration can be
satisfied with a smaller equilibrium bonus compared to relational outsourcing, BI` < BO`.
This immediately implies
Lemma 2. Headquarters strictly prefer relational integration over relational outsourcing. A
headquarter is more likely to offer a relational contract to a supplier the higher the latter’s
level of long-term orientation and the higher a supplier’s contribution to the relationship.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The key implication of Lemma 2 is that headquarters offer relational contracts only to
integrated suppliers. Relational integration by itself, however, is not yet a sufficient condition
for an incentive compatibility of the implicit agreement, since headquarters may as well
deviate from it. A headquarter reneges on the relational agreement by underinvesting in h
and refusing to provide the ex post bonus BI`. H’s maximization problem on the deviation
path reads max βIR(h,mrI`) − h, whereby mrI` is the first-best level of headquarter services
from (9). This maximization problem implies the following investment and revenue on H’s
deviation path:
hDI` = βIηαR
D
I` , R
D
I` = β
αη
1−αη
I (w`τ`)
−α(1−η)
1−α A. (17)
A simple comparison of (17) and (9) implies a lower headquarter investment on the deviation
path as compared to the first best level, i.e. hDI` < hrI`.10 Utilizing (17) in H’s maximization
9 The effect of α on this inequality is ambiguous.
10 As in the case of a supplier’s deviation (see footnote 8), complementarity of inputs implies higher
headquarter’s investment on the deviation path compared to spot contracting, i.e. hDI` > h
s
I`.
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problem, a headquarter’s profit on the deviation path reads:
piDHI` = β
1
1−αη
I (w`τ`)
−α(1−η)
1−α A(1− αη). (18)
A headquarter complies to the relational integration contract if and only if the following
incentive compatibility constraint is fulfilled:
pirHI` +
pirHI`
dN
≥ piDHI`, (19)
whereby pirHI` and piDHI` are given by (15) and (18), respectively. It can be easily shown that
a supplier is willing to participate in relational contracting only if this ICCH is fulfilled.
Otherwise, parties play a non-cooperative game discussed in section 3.1.
The headquarter intensity η affects the ICCH from (19) via two channels. On the one
hand, a decrease in η is associated with lower M ’s deviation incentives and, thereby, higher
H’s profits on the equilibrium path (cf. Lemma 2). Other things being equal, this effect
increases the left-hand side of ICCH . On the other hand, it is straightforward to show that
a lower η is associated with a higher piDHI`, which ceteris paribus increases the right-hand side
of ICCH . The intuition behind the latter effect is similar to the one provided in Lemma 2.
When M ’s contribution to the relationship is relatively high (i.e., η is low), a headquarter
can easily hold-up a supplier ex post and, therefore, H’s deviation incentives increase. It
can be shown that the overall effect of η on ICCH depends on parameter values and cannot
be assigned without ambiguity. Yet, it immediately follows from (19) that lower dN makes
relational integration self-enforcing for a greater range of parameter values. We thus have
Lemma 3. A supplier is more likely to accept a relational integration contract offered by a
headquarter the higher the latter’s long-term orientation.
Proof. Results immediately from (19).
3.3 Equilibrium governance mode
Having calculated the equilibrium profits under relational and spot contracting, we can turn
to the headquarter’s choice of the optimal governance mode and its implication for the in-
ternational make-or-buy decision. As shown in the previous section, final good producers
engaged in relational contracting strictly prefer integration over outsourcing. Under spot
contracting, headquarters self-select into integration vs. outsourcing depending on the head-
quarter intensity of their production processes: Final good producers with high η integrate
their suppliers into firm boundaries, whereas those with low η cooperate with the latter at
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arm’s-length (cf. Lemma 1). In any given foreign location `, headquarters prefer relational
integration over spot contracting whenever the former yields a higher present value of the
profit flow, (1+dN )
dN
pirHI` ≥ max
{
(1+dN )
dN
pisHO`,
(1+dN )
dN
pisHI`
}
, and it is self-enforcing. Formally, a
final good producer decides in favor of relational contracting if and only if
pirHI` ≥ max {pisHO`, pisHI`} , s.t. ICCM and ICCH .
As shown in Lemma 2, a headquarter’s profit under relational integration, pirHI` is increasing
in the supplier’s level of long-term orientation. Furthermore, ICCM and ICCH are more
likely to hold the more long-term oriented a supplier and a final good producer, respectively
(cf. Lemma 3). Yet, a higher level of both parties’ long-term orientation levels not only
increases the relative attractiveness of relational governance, but also has an effect on the
relative prevalence of vertical integration. Given that integration is a strictly dominant
form under relational contracting, while a fraction of final good producers engaged in spot
contracting opt out for outsourcing (if η is sufficiently low), we have the following
Proposition. The likelihood of an integration of a foreign supplier into firm boundaries
is (weakly) increasing in a supplier’s and a headquarter’s level of long-term orientation.
Proof. Follows immediately from Lemmas 1 through 3 and the discussion above.
The effect of time-preference rate on the relative prevalence of integration is weak (rather
than strict) since some final good producers that were previously engaged in spot integration
may now choose relational contracting without changing the (integrated) ownership struc-
ture. Yet, some headquarters that were sourcing intermediate inputs from an independent
supplier under a spot contract may switch to relational contracting due to a higher level of
long-term orientation and, hereby, integrate a supplier into firm boundaries.
4 Empirical Implementation
4.1 Data
To test the key theoretical prediction of this paper, I combine several datasets. Following the
bulk of the recent empirical literature on multinational firm boundaries, I use industry-level
information on U.S. intra-firm trade from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Related Party Trade
Database to capture the propensity of firms to source goods within firm boundaries.11 More
specifically, the left-hand side variable is defined as the share of related party imports in
11 The suitability of this information to measure the international make-or-buy decisions is extensively
discussed in Antràs (2015), from where this data is also drawn.
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total (i.e., related and non-related) U.S. imports.12 A higher share of imports sourced from
a related party (henceforth, intra-firm import share, IFIS) reflects a greater willingness of
U.S. firms to obtain an ownership or control stake in foreign suppliers and, thus, captures
the relative attractiveness of integration vs. outsourcing. Following Antràs (2015), I consider
the period 2000-2011 and restrict the analysis to 390 manufacturing industries, defined at
six-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) level.13
The key explanatory variable is the index of a country’s long-term orientation (LTO)
from Hofstede et al. (2010).14 This measure is one of the five key dimensions developed by
Dutch sociologist Geert Hofstede to characterize fundamental cross-cultural differences.15
Hofstede et al. (2010: 239) define long-term orientation as the cultural value that “stands
for the fostering of virtues oriented toward future rewards, in particular, perseverance and
thrift” and show that this measure is positively correlated with the importance ascribed to
receiving profits in the future rather than obtaining short-term benefits. In this respect,
it is well-suited as a proxy for a time preference rate. The LTO measure varies between 0
(short-term orientation) and 100 (long-term orientation). For easier comparability of results,
it has been rescaled to the unit interval, see Table 5 in Appendix B.
To better understand if the relationship between long-term orientation and make-or-buy
decision is causal, I apply the instrumental variables approach. Using data from Gorod-
nichenko and Roland (2011), I construct two instruments for the LTO : Euclidian (EDist)
and Mahalanobis (Mdist) distance between the frequency of blood types in a given coun-
try and the frequency of blood types in Japan, cf. Table 5 in Appendix B.16 The choice of
Japan as a benchmark country is motived by the fact that this country has a second-highest
LTO-score.17 Moreover, Japanese firms are widely known for their tendency to engage in
relational contracting (cf. , e.g., the case of Toyota discussed in the introduction). As shown
in figures 1 and 2, countries that are more genetically distant from Japan tend to have a
12 Census Bureau defines ‘related parties’ as firms “with various types of relationships including any person
directly or indirectly, owning, controlling or holding power to vote, 6 percent of the outstanding voting
stock or shares of any organization”.
13 See Data Appendix in Antràs (2015) for further discussion of the data.
14 This score is publicly available at: http://www.geerthofstede.eu
15 The other four cultural dimensions are individualism vs. collectivism, masculinity vs. femininity,
uncertainty avoidance, and power distance.
16 The Euclidian genetic distance of country ` from Japan (JPN) is defined as EDist(`, JPN) = [(fA,JPN−
fA,`)
2+(fB,JPN − fB,`)2], where ft,` denotes the frequency of blood type t ∈ {A,B} in country `. The
Mahalanobis distance takes into account the covariance between blood type frequencies. In general,
a Mahalanobis distance distance between a vector x and y picked from distributions X is defined as
MDist(x, y) = [(x − y)′∑−1X (x − y)]1/2, where ∑X is the covariance matrix for X. In the current
context,
∑
X = var(fA,` , fB,`).
17 The country with the highest LTO-index is South Korea. However, the goodness of fit in the regression
of LTO on Euclidian (R2 = 0.122) and Mahalanobis (R2 = 0.166) blood distance to South Korea is
about half of the one in the case of Japan (cf. figures 1 and 2). Hence, to avoid biases associated with
weak instruments, I use Japan as the benchmark country.
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lower level of long-term orientation. To be clear, these figures do not postulate a causal
relationship between genes and cultural attributes such as long-term orientation. Instead,
if parents transmit not only genes, but also their cultural values to their offspring, popula-
tions that are genetically close will happen to be also culturally close.18 At the same time,
genetic instruments are likely to satisfy the exclusion restriction. Given that blood types
are ‘neutral’ genetic markers (i.e. have no impact on individuals’ physical and cognitive
abilities), they do not have a direct effect on a country’s economic outcomes. Furthermore,
it is very unlikely that firms make their international make-or-buy decisions based on the
genetic distance to the hosts countries.
Figure 1: LTO and Euclidian genetic distance. Figure 2: LTO and Mahalanobis genetic distance.
Finally, to test the impact of a final good producer’s time preference rate on the relative
prevalence of integration, I construct a measure of long-term orientation that varies across
U.S. sectors. More specifically, I use information on the ancestry of U.S. citizens from the
2000 U.S. Census to estimate the ethnic composition of U.S. industries. In this census, 80.1
percent of the population reported their ethnic origin, 58 percent of which specified a single
ancestry, and 22 percent provided two ancestries. For the construction of the measure, I
use the first ancestry indicated by an individual.19 Since the theoretical model presented
above emphasizes the effect of cultural distance on the managerial make-or-buy decisions,
my baseline measures for cultural composition of a sector include only those individuals who
indicated their occupation as ‘Manager’ or ‘C.E.O’.20 Having calculated the ethnic shares of
managers in a given industry, I weigh them with the long-term orientation scores of their
18 This correlation is well aligned with the recent literature, which argues that culture is transmitted
mostly inside the family, see, e.g., Bisin and Verdier (2010) for an overview.
19 The results are robust to construction of an index that incorporates a person’s first and second ancestry.
20 Robustness checks show that the results continue to hold if one considers the workforce as a whole.
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ancestor’s country of origin to obtain industry-specific measures of long-term orientation:
ltoj =
∑
`
S`jLTO`, (20)
where S`j is the share of ethnic group ` in industry j and LTO` is the long-term orientation of
this ethnic group. Once again, the intuition behind this approach builds on recent empirical
evidence that cultural traits are (partly) inherited from the ancestors (cf. Algan and Cahuc
2010, 2014). I consider two versions of this measure. The first one, lto1j, includes only those
managers who report their ancestry. For the second measure, lto2j, I assign the average
U.S. score to all managers in the U.S. census who do not report their ancestry. Table 6
in Appendix B presents the ten industries with the lowest and highest level of long-term
orientation. To be clear, this approach merely exploits the distribution of long-term oriented
managers across industries and does not posit inherent differences in long-term orientation
between them. In view of this paper’s theoretical proposition, one would expect a higher
fraction of intra-firm imports in industries with higher ltoj scores.
4.2 Econometric Specification
This paper’s baseline specification reads:
IFISj`t =a×LTO` + b1×log (R&DInt)j` + b2×log (CapInt)j` + b3×log (SkillInt)j`
+b4×Freightj` + b5×Tarifj` + b6×Dispersionj` + b7×Elasticityj` + b×X` + ε,
where IFIS is the U.S. intra-firm import share from the U.S. Bureau of Customs and
Border Protection and j, `, and t index sectors, countries, and years, respectively. The key
explanatory variable is the level of a foreign country’s long-term orientation, LTO`.
Control variables 1 through 7 are standard in the empirical literature studying the in-
ternational make-or-buy decision and are drawn from Antràs (2015). Since the suitability
of these variables has been discussed at length in Antràs (2015), the introduction of control
variables in the current paper is deliberately brief. In order to test for the key prediction of
the Property Right Theory (cf. Lemma 1), headquarter intensity (η) is proxied by the R&D-,
capital-, and skill-intensity. More specifically, Log(R&DInt) denotes the log of Research and
Development expenditures as a share of total sales, Log(CapInt) is the log of the real capital
stock per worker, and Log(SkillInt) is defined as the log of the number of non-production
workers divided by total employment. Using a Property Rights model featuring firm-level
heterogeneity and a tradeoff between domestic and foreign sourcing, Antràs (2015) finds a
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positive effect of trade cost and productivity dispersion and an ambiguous effect of demand
elasticity on the share of intra-firm trade. To account for these predictions, I follow Antràs
(2015) in including controls for FreightCost (the ratio of CIF imports to FOB imports) and
U.S. Tariffs, a measure for the Dispersion of firm productivities (constructed as the standard
deviation of log exports across U.S. port locations and destination countries), and a proxy
for the Elasticity of demand.
One might argue that a country’s level of long-term orientation merely reflects the sta-
bility of its institutions. In order to rule out the effect of legal institutions on the prevalence
of integration, I include a wide range of institutional controls. In this paper, I report only
the effect of government stability (GovStability) and provide the robustness checks including
alternative institutional measures upon request. This proxy stems from the International
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and measures both the government’s ability to carry out its de-
clared program(s), and its ability to stay in office, averaged over 1980 through 2000. Finally,
cultural attributes of a society might also be a function of its size or economic develop-
ment. To rule out this alternative explanation, I include the log of a country’s GDP in 2000,
Log(GDP), from Penn World Table as an additional regressor.
4.3 Empirical Analysis
As a first pass at the data, I regress the share of U.S. intra-firm imports (IFIS) against
the level of a country’s long-term orientation, LTO. As shown in specification (1) of table 1,
the correlation between these two measures is positive and highly significant. A long-term
oriented country such as Japan has over 50% of imports that are intra-firm, whereas for a
rather short-term oriented country like Portugal this fraction is less than 25%. While this
correlation is informative, one obviously needs to control for other variables to see if this
relation is not driven by omitted factors. Columns (2)-(5) in table 1 report the results of
the baseline OLS regressions. As one adds more controls, the coefficient on LTO decreases
but remains significant throughout the specifications. Estimates for the control variables in
columns (2) and (4) are broadly in line with previous empirical studies of global sourcing,
cf. Chapter 8 in Antràs (2015). In particular, Log(R&DInt) and Log(CapitalInt) both
have the predicted sign and are significant, while Log(SkillInt) has the right sign but is not
significant in all specifications. This evidence suggests that a country’s LTO may have an
independent impact on firms’ make-or-buy decisions alongside the well-established channel
of the Property Rights Theory of the firm.
Clearly, the results from the simple OLS regression presented above are not sufficient to
claim a causal impact of LTO on intra-firm imports. For instance, given that the presence of
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multinational firms itself may affect a country’s time preferences, the previously mentioned
econometric model is prone to reverse causality. In order to deal with the issue of endo-
geneity at stake, I apply the instrumental variables approach. A country’s LTO has been
instrumented by Euclidian blood distance (EDist) in column (6) and Mahalanobis blood dis-
tance (MDist) in column (7). In both cases, a country’s LTO has a positive and significant
effect on IFIS. Notably, the magnitude of IV coefficients on LTO are larger compared to
the corresponding OLS coefficients. In view of the strong first stage fit and a high F -value
(F = 106.33 and F = 102.13 if LTO is instrumented by EDist and MDist, respectively),
this difference cannot be attributed to weak instruments but rather suggests the presence of
measurement errors in the OLS regression.
Table 1: Determinants of U.S. Intra-firm Import Shares.
Dependent variable: IFIS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LTO 0.079*** 0.078*** 0.076*** 0.076*** 0.028*** 0.064*** 0.041***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.016) (0.015)
Log(R&DInt) 0.035*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Log(CapInt) 0.016*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Log(SkillInt) 0.028* 0.000 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
FreightCost -0.786*** -0.799*** -0.801*** -0.799*** -0.801***
(0.112) (0.113) (0.113) (0.112) (0.113)
Tariffs -0.001** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dispersion -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Elasticity -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log(GDP) 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.020***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
GovStability 0.027*** 0.024*** 0.026***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 239,055 239,055 239,055 239,055 226,842 226,842 226,842
R-squared 0.003 0.034 0.045 0.046 0.057 0.057 0.057
Note: The table reports estimates of OLS regressions in columns (1)-(5) and IV regressions in columns (6)-(7). Robust
standard errors are clustered at the industry level and presented in brackets. ***, **, * denote 1, 5, 10 % significance.
The evidence presented above corroborates this paper’s theoretical prediction regarding
the impact of a foreign country’s long-term orientation on the international make-or-buy de-
cision. In order to study the effect of home managers’ long-term orientation, I run regressions
along the lines of the baseline specification but substitute LTO with lto1 and lto2. Columns
(1) and (2) in table 2 show that both measures are indeed positively and significantly corre-
lated with the intra-firm import shares.21 Notably, the coefficient on lto2 (which assigns the
average U.S. LTO-score to all respondents who didn’t report their ancestry) is smaller in
21 The number of observations is different in table 2 relative to table 1 since industry classification in U.S.
Census is coarser then in the database of the U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection.
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magnitude relative to the lto1. This is not surprising given that the U.S. LTO-score belongs
to the lowest quartile in the long-term orientation rank. The magnitude of both coefficients
remains roughly similar when controlling for year fixed effects in specifications (3) and (4).
The effect of lto1 and lto2 continues to be be highly significant after controlling for both year
and country fixed effects, although the size of the estimates is slightly reduced, cf. columns
(5) and (6).
Table 2: Determinants of U.S. Intra-firm Import Shares.
Dependent variable: IFIS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lto1 1.442*** 1.441*** 1.182***
(0.410) (0.410) (0.404)
lto2 1.275*** 1.273*** 1.142***
(0.452) (0.452) (0.471)
Log(R&DInt) 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.043*** 0.043***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Log(CapInt) 0.020 0.026** 0.020 0.026** 0.018 0.022*
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Log(SkillInt) -0.023 -0.053 -0.022 -0.053 -0.010 -0.039
(0.032) (0.040) (0.032) (0.040) (0.035) (0.042)
FreightCost -0.274 -0.153 -0.273 -0.152 -0.377 -0.259
(0.382) (0.450) (0.381) (0.449) (0.385) (0.440)
Tariffs -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Dispersion 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.021 0.022
(0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036)
Elasticity -0.003** -0.002** -0.003** -0.002** -0.003** -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log(GDP) 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
GovStability 0.034*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.034***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Fixed Effects None None Year Year Ctr/Year Ctr/Year
Observations 34,935 34,935 34,935 34,935 34,935 34,935
R-squared 0.093 0.087 0.098 0.093 0.283 0.280
Note: Robust standard errors are clustered at the industry level and presented in brackets. ***, **,
* denote 1, 5, 10 % significance.
4.4 Alternative proxies
As a robustness check, I rerun the above-mentioned regressions using different proxies for
the prevalence of relational contracting and alternative instruments. The choice of these
measures is motived by the theoretical literature on repeated games, which commonly in-
terprets a party’s time preference rate as an inverse measure of this party’s trustworthiness
(see, e.g., Kvaloy and Olson 2009 and MacLeod 2007). In particular, trustworthy managers
are more likely to abide by their long-term implicit commitments rather than seizing one-
shot profit opportunities and deviating from a relational agreement. In view of this paper’s
key theoretical prediction, one would expect a higher prevalence of integration whenever the
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trust level of foreign suppliers and domestic headquarters is high.
This paper’s measure of trust is constructed using the integrated dataset of the European
Values Survey (EVS) and the World Values Survey (WVS), from 1980-2008. I choose the
2005-2007 WVS wave as a benchmark wave due to the largest number of surveyed countries.22
Missing data for several European and non-European countries is gathered from the 2008
EVS wave and former WVS waves.23 Individual perceptions of trust in WVS and EVS are
measured by the generalized trust question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most
people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” To answer
this question, respondents were asked to choose one of the following two options: “Most
people can be trusted”, or “Can’t be too careful”. The fraction of individuals in a given
country choosing the first response will be used as a country’s level of Trust, cf. table 7 in
Appendix B.24
In order to identify a causal effect of Trust on the make-or-buy decision, this paper
builds on the approach suggested by Algan and Cahuc (2010). To construct an instrument
for the level of Trust, I use data from the General Social Survey (GSS), which, in contrast to
EVS/WVS, measures social attitudes exclusively of the U.S. residents. I further restrict the
relevant sample to those respondents who were born in the US, but whose parents and/or
grandparents immigrated to this country. More specifically, respondents to GSS indicate
since 1977 their birthplace and the number of parents and/or grandparents that were born
in the US. Following Algan and Cahuc (2010), I define a US immigrant as a person who was
born in the US and who has at least one abroad-born ancestor (parent and/or grandparent).25
The variable for the respondent’s ancestral country of origin reads as follows: “From what
countries or part of the world did your ancestors come?” Up to the year 1984, the dataset
contains information on a single country of origin. Thereafter, respondents were allowed
to report up to three countries of origin and to indicate which of these countries they felt
closest to.26 In order to make the comparison across years feasible, I consider the country
which a respondent felt mostly associated with as the ancestral country of origin. Among
those countries which are represented in the EVS/WVS dataset, the GSS contains a subset
of 28 countries of origin (cf. table 8 in Appendix). Individual perceptions of trust in GSS
are measured by the same ‘trust question’ as in EVS/WVS. As an answer to this question,
22 The results are similar by considering previous waves or taking averages across waves in a given country.
23 Table 7 in Appendix B reports the country list and the respective survey wave.
24 This measure of ‘generalized trust’ has been extensively used in the literature to study the effect of
social capital on various economic outcomes, see Guiso et al. (2010) for an overview. The effect of trust
on the make-or-buy decision, however, has not been unexplored in this literature.
25 All results remain robust to imposing a narrower definition of an immigrant (e.g., having at least one
parent and grandparent that were born abroad).
26 Nevertheless, the great majority of respondents still reported a single country of origin.
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respondents were able to choose one of the following three options: “Most people can be
trusted”, “Can’t be too careful”, and “Depends”. I construct a trust indicator which is equal
to 1 if the respondent selected the first option and 0 if the respondent indicated one of the
latter two options.27 As before, I calculate for each country the mean fraction of individuals
choosing the first option and borrow from Algan and Cahuc (2010) the label Inherited Trust
for this measure. As shown in figure 3, the two measures of trust are positively correlated.
Once again, this correlation suggests that cultural values and social norms are transmitted
mostly inside the family. Yet, since the trust level of an immigrant’s descendants is not
affected by the current economic or institutional development in the ancestor’s country of
origin, it is likely to satisfy the exclusion restriction.
Figure 3: Trust and Inherited Trust.
Lastly, to test the impact of final good producers’ trustworthiness on the relative preva-
lence of integration, I construct the measure of trust that varies across U.S. sectors. The
construction of this measure is by analogy to (22):
trustj =
∑
`
S`jTrust`, (22)
whereby S`j is the share of ethnic group ` in industry j and Trust` is the level of trust of
this ethnic group. As before, I consider two versions of this measure: trust1j, which includes
only those managers who report their ancestry, and trust2j, which assigns the average U.S.
score to all respondents of the U.S. census who do not report their ancestry.
The first column of table 3 reports a positive correlation between a foreign country’s
level of trust and the share of intra-firm imports. After including the above-mentioned
control variables in columns (2)-(5), the coefficient on Trust decreases but remains sig-
27 I run robustness checks by putting together the first and third option or dropping the answer „Depends“.
The results are qualitatively unchanged.
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nificant throughout the specifications. As before, positive and significant coefficients on
Log(R&DInt) and Log(CapitalInt) suggest that headquarter intensity continues to play an
important role for firms’ make-or-buy decisions alongside the novel channel emphasized in
the current paper. In order to come closer towards a causal inference of the novel prediction,
Trust is instrumented by Inhereted Trust in specification (6). The positive coefficient on
Trust continues to be highly significant.
Table 3: Determinants of U.S. Intra-firm Import Shares.
Dependent variable: IFIS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trust 0.207*** 0.203*** 0.202*** 0.202*** 0.167*** 0.262***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.026)
Log(R&DInt) 0.035*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.029***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Log(CapInt) 0.016*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.020***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Log(SkillInt) 0.027* -0.000 0.003 0.004 0.010
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018)
FreightCost -0.779*** -0.792*** -0.796*** -0.834***
(0.111) (0.112) (0.111) (0.132)
Tariffs -0.001** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Dispersion -0.006 -0.005 0.002
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012)
Elasticity -0.001** -0.001** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log(GDP) 0.021*** 0.009***
(0.001) (0.002)
GovStability 0.019*** -0.007*
(0.002) (0.004)
Observations 246,643 246,643 246,643 246,643 230,233 111,525
R-squared 0.011 0.042 0.052 0.053 0.065 0.052
Note: The table reports estimates of OLS regressions in columns (1)-(5) and of an IV regression in column
(6). Robust standard errors are clustered at the industry level and presented in brackets. ***, **, * denote
1, 5, 10 % significance.
To test the effect of final good producers’ trust levels on the international make-or-buy
decision, I regress the share of intra-firm imports against trust1 and trust2, cf. table 4.
Notice from specifications (1) and (2) that coefficient on trust2 (which assigns the average
U.S. Trust-score to all managers who didn’t report their ancestry) is higher in magnitude
than the one on trust1. This result can be easily rationalized by the fact that the U.S.
Trust-index belongs to the highest quartile in the rank of trust scores. Yet, while the
coefficient on trust1 is significant at the 5% level, the coefficient on trust2 is significant only
at the 10% level. This finding is not surprising given that, by assigning the U.S. Trust-score
to all respondents of the U.S. Census, it takes out some of the variation on the industry
level. A similar pattern emerges after controlling for year fixed effects, cf. specifications (3)
and (4). Once one includes year and country fixed effects (see specifications (5) and (6)),
both coefficients lose their significance. A possible explanation behind this result is that
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the measure of generalized trust is a very broad concept and it not necessarily tantamount
to the notion of time preference rate used in the theoretical model. Nevertheless, the fact
that coefficients trust1 and trust2 are positive throughout the specifications is generally in
support of this paper’s theoretical prediction.
Table 4: Determinants of U.S. Intra-firm Import Shares.
Dependent variable: IFIS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
trust1 1.167** 1.166** 0.635
(0.483) (0.482) (0.560)
trust2 1.412* 1.413* 0.557
(0.838) (0.837) (0.912)
Log(R&DInt) 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.042*** 0.042***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Log(CapInt) 0.029** 0.030** 0.029** 0.030** 0.026** 0.027**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Log(SkillInt) -0.019 -0.005 -0.019 -0.005 -0.004 0.003
(0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037)
FreightCost -0.384 -0.430 -0.383 -0.428 -0.473 -0.495
(0.428) (0.429) (0.428) (0.428) (0.422) (0.421)
Tariffs -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Dispersion 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.004 0.002
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035)
Elasticity -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log(GDP) 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
GovStability 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Fixed Effects None None Year Year Ctr/Year Ctr/Year
Observations 35,299 35,299 35,299 35,299 35,299 35,299
R-squared 0.083 0.083 0.089 0.088 0.275 0.274
Note: Robust standard errors are clustered at the industry level and presented in brackets. ***, **,
* denote 1, 5, 10 % significance.
5 Concluding Comments
This paper presents a repeated game model of global sourcing in which final good producers
decide whether to engage in relational contracting and whether to integrate their suppliers
into firm boundaries or deal with the latter at arm’s length. The key prediction of this model
is that the likelihood of vertical integration is increasing in cooperation parties’ long-term
orientation. Combining data on U.S. intra-firm imports with various proxies for long-term
orientation, I find strong support for this theoretical prediction, controlling for a wide range
of additional variables and accounting for the issue of endogeneity. Although one cannot
rule out that agents’ time-preference rates affect the integration decision via channels other
than the ones suggested in the current model, this paper’s empirical results shed new light
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on the role of culture in the international organization of production.
This paper leaves several questions open for future investigation. First, this model’s
key theoretical prediction is derived in a partial equilibrium set-up. While I believe that
this key result will continue to hold after extending this framework to a general equilibrium
model, such an approach may provide further insights into the effect of culture on the
international make-or-buy decision and the patterns of international trade. Second, due to
current unavailability of firm-level datasets featuring detailed information on international
integration decisions, the empirical analysis in this paper was conducted on the industry level.
Once extensive firm-level data on international make-or-buy decisions becomes available, this
paper’s theoretical prediction should be empirically reassessed.
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A Mathematical Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Consider first the slope of ΘsH(η). Simple differentiation of (8) with respect to η yields
∂ΘsH(η)
∂η
=
α
1− αΘ
s
H ([ln βI − ln βO] + [ln(1− βO)− ln(1− βI)]) > 0,
whereby the positive sign of the derivative results from the fact that expressions in squared
brackets are greater than zero for all βI > βO.
Consider next the corner solutions of ΘsH(η). If η = 1, spot integration strictly dominates
spot outsourcing, since ΘsH |η=1 = (βI/βO)
1
1−α > 1 when βI > βO. If η = 0, the sign of
ΘsH |η=0 =
βI
βO
(
1− βI
1− βO
) α
1−α
is ambiguous. The sign of the first order derivative of this expression with respect to βh`I
∂ΘsH`|η=0
∂βI
=
[1− βI − α]
βO(1− βI)(1− α)
(
1− βI
1− βO
) α
1−α
depends on the sign of the term in the squared brackets. If 1− βI < α, this term is negative
and ΘsH |η=0 is decreasing in βI . That is, if ΘsH(0) ≤ 1 for the lowest possible βI = βI , it
holds ΘsH |η=0 < 1 a fortiori for all βI > βI . Recall that βI = βO. It can be immediately seen
that ΘsH |η=0 = 1 for βI = βO. Hence, ΘsH |η=0 < 1 for all βI > βO. In contrast, if 1− βI > α,
we have ∂ΘsH`|η=0/∂βI > 0 and spot outsourcing is never chosen as the organizational form
(since ΘsH |η=0 > 1 and ΘsH(η) is increasing in η). In order to allow for both organizational
forms in equilibrium, I impose Assumption 1 in the main text.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Denote the right-hand side of (16) by RHS. Differentiating RHS with respect to η yields
∂RHS
∂η
=
α(1− βk)
1
1−α(1−η) (1− α(1− η)− ln(1− βk))
1− α(1− η) > 0,
whereby the sign of this derivative follows from the fact that (1−α(1−η)) > 0 and ln(1−βk) <
0 for all α, η, βk < 0. A simple differentiation of RHS with respect to d` yields
∂RHS
∂d`
=
(1− βk)
1
1−α(1−η) (1− α(1− η))
(1 + d`)2
> 0,
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whereas the first-order derivative of RHS with respect to βk immediately implies
∂RHS
∂βk
= −(1− βk)
α(1−η)
1−α(1−η) < 0.
A.3 Ex-ante Transfers
This section explores the robustness of the paper’s key results to an alternative contracting
assumption. Following Antràs and Helpman (2004, 2008), I assume that the ex-ante contract
includes an upfront participation fee Tk`, that has to be paid by a supplier. Assuming an
infinitely elastic supply of M , M ’s profits from spot contracting net of ex-ante transfer is
equal to a supplier’s outside option, ωm. In equilibrium, we thus have pisMk`−Tk` = ωm. It is
well-known from Antràs and Helpman (2004, 2008) that the presence of ex-ante transfers has
no effect on both parties’ investment levels and the resulting profits from ex-post bargaining.
We thus can use the results from (7) to derive the equilibrium transfer:
Tk` = (1− βk)
(
βηk(1− βk)(1−η)
) α
1−α (w`τ`)
−α(1−η)
1−α A(1− α(1− η))− ωm. (23)
If the transfers were allowed, the entire surplus from the relationship accrues to H. Combin-
ing pisHk` from (7) with the above transfer, we obtain the overall profit under spot contracting:
pik`(η) =
(
βηk(1− βk)(1−η)
) α
1−α (1− α[βkη + (1− βk)(1− η)]) (w`τ`)−
α(1−η)
1−α A− ωm. (24)
As in the case without transfers, the choice of organizational form crucially depends on the
headquarter intensity η. A headquarter decides to cooperate with a supplier under spot
integration rather than spot outsourcing whenever
Θs(η) ≡ ΠI`
ΠO`
=
(
βηI (1− βI)(1−η)
) α
1−α (1− α[βIη + (1− βI)(1− η)])
(βηO(1− βO)(1−η))
α
1−α (1− α[βOη + (1− βO)(1− η)])
is larger than one. Following the approach discussed in Appendix A.1, one can derive the
result analogous to Lemma 1: There exists a unique headquarter intensity ηˆ ∈ (0, 1), such
that headquarter profit is higher under spot outsourcing (integration) for η < ηˆ (respectively,
η > ηˆ). Unlike Lemma 1, however, this result does not require Assumption 1.
Consider now the case of relational contracting. In the presence of ex-ante transfers,
investments on the equilibrium path are still described by (9). The competitive fringe of
suppliers in the presence of ex-ante transfers, implies, however, that a supplier’s profits
net of up-front payment and of ex-post bonus are driven down to M ’s outside option, i.e.
pirMk`−Tk` = ωm, whereby pirMk` and Tk` are given by (10) and (23), respectively. On the off-
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the equilibrium path, investments are still given by (11) and a supplier’s one-shot deviation
profits net of the ex-ante transfer reads:
piDMk`−Tk` = (w`τ`)−
α(1−η)
1−α A(1−α(1−η))(1−βk)
[
(1− βk)
α(1−η)
1−α(1−η) − β
αη
1−α
k (1− βk)
α(1−η)
1−α
]
. (25)
Notice thatM ’s profit on the deviation path is positive if the expression in the squared brack-
ets is larger than zero. Given that β
αη
1−α
k < 1, it is sufficient to show that (1− βk)
α(1−η)
1−α(1−η) >
(1− βk)
α(1−η)
1−α in order to ensure that piDMk` − Tk` is positive. The latter inequality is in fact
fulfilled since 1 − α(1 − η) > 1 − α for all parameter values. Hence, as in the case without
ex-ante transfers, M can reap positive profits by reneging on the relational agreement.
The headquarter is willing to engage in relational contracting only if a supplier’s incentive
compatibility constraint is fulfilled. In the presence of ex-ante transfers, this ICCM reads:
(1 + d`)ωm
d`
≥ piDMk` − Tk`, (26)
whereby piDMk`−Tk` is given by (25). As in Lemma 2, the ICCM is more likely to hold under
relational integration rather than relational outsourcing. To prove this, I differentiate the
right-hand side of (26) with respect to βk and obtain after simplification:
∂(piDMk` − Tk`)
∂βk
= − (w`τ`)
−α(1−η)1−α A
βk(1− α)
[
(1− α)β(1− βk)
α(1−η)
1−α(1−η) + (1− α(1− η))(αη − β)β
αη
1−α
k (1− βk)
α(1−η)
1−α
]
This first order derivative is negative if and only if the expression in squared brackets is
positive. A tedious but straightforward analysis shows that the latter expression is larger
than zero for all parameter values. Hence, headquarters strictly prefer relational integration
over relational outsourcing. Furthermore, as in Lemma 2, H is more likely to offer a relational
contract to M the higher the latter’s level of long-term orientation (i.e., the lower d`).28
Finally, if the transfers were allowed, a supplier is willing to accept a relational integration
contract offered by a headquarter only if H’s incentive compatibility constraint is fulfilled:
1 + dN
dN
[
(w`τ`)
−α(1−η)
1−α (1− α)A− ωm
]
≥ piDHI` + Tk`,
whereby piDHI` and Tk` are given by (18) and (23), respectively. As in Lemma 3, a supplier
is more likely to engage in relational integration the higher a headquarter’s long-term orien-
tation (i.e., the lower dN). To sum up, the key result of the Benchmark model continues to
hold under the assumption of ex-ante transfers.
28 The effect of headquarter intensity η on the likelihood of relational contracting shown in Lemma 2 holds
only under certain parameter restrictions, which can be provided upon request.
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B Tables
Table 5: Level of long-term orientation, Euclidian and Mahalanobis distance to Japan.
Country LTO EDist MDist Country LTO EDist MDist
Albania .61 .113 1.878 Latvia .69 .018 .324
Algeria .26 .130 2.479 Lithuania .82 .078 1.476
Argentina .2 .106 1.956 Luxembourg .64 .124 2.213
Armenia .61 .089 1.478 Macedonia .62 .050 .895
Australia .21 1.110 2.987 Malaysia .41 .107 1.840
Austria .60 .075 1.356 Mali .20 .129 2.317
Azerbaijan .61 .055 .968 Mexico .24 .189 3.607
Bangladesh .47 .120 2.028 Moldova .71 .039 .695
Belarus .81 .039 .754 Morocco .14 .141 2.690
Belgium .82 .120 2.185 Netherlands .67 .113 2.078
Bosnia .70 .054 .973 New Zealand .33 .111 2.082
Brazil .44 .097 1.797 Nigeria .13 .147 2.717
Bulgaria .69 .049 .859 Norway .35 .116 2.023
Burkina Faso .27 .130 2.307 Pakistan .50 .127 2.120
Canada .36 .107 1.997 Peru .25 .235 4.463
Chile .31 .174 3.319 Philippines .27 .112 2.077
China .87 .090 1.573 Poland .38 .031 .595
Colombia .13 .144 2.731 Portugal .28 .118 2.082
Croatia .58 .045 .826 Romania .52 .040 .705
Czech Republic .70 .034 .605 Russia .81 .023 .439
Denmark .35 .097 1.763 Rwanda .18 .145 2.694
Dominican Rep. .13 .097 1.839 Saudi Arabia .36 .136 2.483
Egypt .07 .036 .627 Serbia .52 .053 .935
El Salvador .20 .192 3.652 Singapore .72 .096 1.663
Estonia .82 .040 .762 Slovak Republic .77 .020 .378
Finland .38 .054 .945 Slovenia .49 .058 1.063
France .63 .114 2.060 South Africa .34 .111 2.075
Georgia .38 .090 1.719 Spain .48 .111 1.984
Germany .83 .084 1.516 Sweden .53 .097 1.707
Ghana .04 .138 2.503 Switzerland .74 .091 1.640
Greece .45 .081 1.520 Tanzania .34 .163 3.049
Hungary .58 .035 .595 Thailand .32 .131 2.245
Iceland .28 .149 2.831 Trinidad & Tobago .13 .121 2.135
India .51 .128 2.156 Turkey .46 .055 .948
Indonesia .62 .112 1.938 United Kingdom .51 .113 2.101
Iran .14 .062 1.110 U.S.A. .26 .101 1.912
Iraq .25 .063 1.117 Uganda .24 .117 2.124
Ireland .24 .143 2.729 Ukraine .86 .030 .568
Israel .38 .049 .940 Uruguay .26 .093 1.716
Italy .61 .102 1.886 Venezuela .16 .134 2.546
Japan .88 0 0 Vietnam .57 .132 2.280
Jordan .16 .070 1.334 Zambia .30 .120 2.238
Korea South 1 .064 1.073 Zimbabwe .15 .134 2.499
Table 6: Ten industries with the highest and lowest prevalence of long-term orientated managers.
lto1 10 industries with highest long-term orientation lto1 10 industries with lowest long-term orientation
.424 Carpet and rug mills .552 Motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment
.430 Animal slaughtering and processing .555 Dairy products
.449 Apparel accessories and other apparel .556 Other transportation equipment
.464 Fruit and vegetable preserving .557 Household appliances
.465 Fabric mills, except knitting .565 Agricultural chemicals
.477 Fiber, yarn, and thread mills .566 Metalworking machinery
.478 Textile and fabric finishing and coating mills .568 Engines, turbines, and power transmission
.480 Bakeries, except retail .576 Animal food, grain and oilseed milling
.482 Textile product mills except carpets and rugs .577 Construction mining and oil field machinery
.489 Leather tanning and products, except footwear .596 Agricultural implements
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Table 8: Descriptive statistics for the “Trust question” in the GSS.
Country N “Trust most “Can’t be “Depends” Inherited trust
people” too careful”
Austria 83 39 38 6 .47
Belgium 21 10 11 0 .47
Canada 282 127 142 13 .45
China 27 12 14 1 .44
Czech Republic 202 97 95 10 .48
Denmark 81 46 32 3 .57
Finland 62 31 27 12 .5
France 128 51 65 57 .44
Germany 1312 574 681 57 .44
Greece 59 20 32 7 .34
Hungary 92 39 49 4 .42
India 10 2 6 2 .2
Ireland 797 430 335 32 .54
Italy 918 350 526 42 .38
Japan 43 20 21 2 .46
Lithuania 47 20 24 3 .42
Mexico 422 112 297 13 .26
Netherlands 127 63 57 7 .5
Norway 239 137 95 7 .57
Philippines 24 8 16 20 .33
Poland 465 213 227 25 .46
Portugal 45 15 24 6 .33
Romania 17 4 12 1 .23
Russia 205 98 94 13 .48
Spain 68 29 35 4 .43
Sweden 215 114 89 12 .53
Switzerland 43 23 19 1 .53
United Kingdom 791 430 328 33 .54
“N” represents the number of US-born American residents with at least one abroad-born ancestor. Canada summa-
rizes the entries for “French Canada” and “Other Canada”; United Kingdom summarizes the entries for “England &
Wales” and “Scotland”; Czech Republic contains the observations for “Czechoslovakia”. Data source: GSS.
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